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ABSTRACT: 
 
Momentum is one of the most studied and robust anomalies in financial markets. There 
have been numerous studies that tries to increase its performance by adding other both 
risk- and behavioral based variables. One of the behavioral based variables is information 
discreteness by Da et al. (2014), which measures the relations between positive and 
negative return days. Information discreteness acts as proxy for investors limited 
information processing capacity. 
Aim of the thesis is to study wether double sorting a portfolio first by momentum and 
then by information discreteness generate risk-adjusted returns on European markets. 
This thesis also extends the existing literature by studying another sample period and 
different continent. 
Using the constituents of Stoxx Europe 600 index as test assets and time-period from 
11/2005 to 8/2019, test portfolios are formed by double sorting stocks into quantiles first 
by its J-month cross-sectional momentum and then by the ID measurement. A total 
number of test portfolios is 25 per formation and holding period. Returns of the test 
portfolios are then regressed against Fama and French (1993 & 2015) factor models that 
also includes the momentum factor. Also, average returns, return distributions and firm 
characteristics in test portfolios are studied. 
Information discreteness based momentum strategy does not generate risk-adjusted 
returns. In every tested portfolio, alpha is not significantly different from zero. The 
momentum factor is mostly the only factor with a significant loading, which indicates that 
that factor drives the returns of the test portfolios. Mean returns of the double sorted 
portfolios, both long only and long-short, are mostly higher than their plain momentum 
benchmark returns. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
KEY WORDS:  momentum, limited attention, behavioral finance
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Momentum has been one of the most robust anomalies in the finance literature during the 
past few decades after Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) brought the anomaly to the wide 
public. After the original documentation of the anomaly, there have been numerous stud-
ies that tries to increase its profitability by taking other variables into account. One po-
tential addition to the momentum is information discreteness by Da, Gurun and Warachka 
(2014) that combines the momentum with the behavioural models. My purpose in this 
thesis is to examine whether the performance of traditional price momentum could be 
increased in the European markets by taking into account the quality of the past J-month 
returns of the stock, measured by information discreteness.  
Before the information discreteness-based momentum could be studied more closely, I 
have to introduce the original anomaly – the momentum. The anomaly is normally im-
plemented by cross-sectionally rank the assets and then buying the assets that have per-
formed well during the past 3 to 12 month and sell the assets that have declined during 
the past 3 to 12 month, and then holding the equal-weighted long-short portfolio for 1 to 
12 months. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found, for example that simple anomaly of con-
structing the portfolio based on the past 12-month performance and then hold the portfolio 
for 3 months could generate on average 1,31 percent per month in the US markets in 
1965–1989.  
Even though Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) constructed their portfolios based on pure past 
return or skipping only one week before the construction, nowadays it is a standard prac-
tise to skip one month before the construction (see e.g. Asness et al. 2013, Da et al. 2014, 
Hillert, Jacobs and Müller 2014). This procedure is due to the fact that over a short time 
period, stock markets tend to reversal, which is caused for example behavioural biases of 
investors or microstructures of the markets (see e.g. Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1996, 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz 2004, and Hou and Moskowitz 2005). 
The findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) has been confirmed ever since across the 
globe in many different time periods, in the different asset classes, in time-series, com-
bined with other anomalies and even other anomalies have been exhibited to follow 
10 
momentum pattern. In the European stock markets, Rouwenhorst (1998) found that the 
12/3 strategy generates on average 1,35 percent per month when Fama and French (2012) 
found that the performance of 12/1 strategy is on average 0,92 percent per month. On 
country index level, for instance, Asness et al. (2013) found the average excess return of 
8,7 percent per year on the 12/1 strategy.   
When in the standard momentum literature assets are ranked based on cross-sectional 
returns, in the time series momentum, trading decisions are based on purely the past return 
of the asset itself. On the future contracts, Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2014) discov-
ered that past 12-month return of the asset is a great predictor of the assets next month 
return. That very same effect is also found on the common stocks, where Lim, Wang and 
Yao (2018) found that the value weighted time series momentum generates on average 
0,76 percent per month. It was also found that both the performance of time series and 
cross-sectional momentum could be increased by combining the both strategies and gen-
erate on average 1,74 percent per month (Lim et al. 2018). 
Gupta and Kelly (2019) took the research even further as they found both the time series 
and cross-sectional momentum effect on factor level. It was discovered that the perfor-
mance of the factor investing could be increased by actively selecting the factors based 
on its past performance or selecting the factors that have better performed relative to other 
factors (Gupta and Kelly 2019).  
Even though the momentum generates significantly positive robust returns even after risk 
adjustments and it has been founded in many different markets and time periods, it has 
weaknesses as the strategy is highly sensitive to crashes that could almost wipe out many 
years of profits. For instance, Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) found in their sample that 
the worst month for momentum had a massive decline of –74,36 percent at August 1932 
and –45,52 percent at April 2009. Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) found similar returns 
from their sample. As a result of the weaknesses of the momentum, both Barroso and 
Santa-Clara (2015) and Daniel and Moskowitz (2016) founded two different risk man-
aged momentum strategies mitigating the drawbacks of the traditional momentum. For 
example, Barroso and Santa-Clara (2015) designed risk-managed momentum strategy, 
where they scale up the momentum strategy to have a constant risk exposure.    
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As the evidence shows, the momentum is clearly a stock market anomaly, but what is the 
true return driver behind the anomaly? After the discovery of the anomaly, there have 
been numerous explanations for it, both “soft” or behavioural and information-based ex-
planations, and “hard” or economic and risk explanations. For example, Hillert et al. 
(2014) argued that the financial media is causing the momentum, but also investors per-
sonality (Chui, Titman and Wei 2010), underreactions (Hong and Stein 1999), market 
sentiment and -constraints (Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan 2012) and even institutional and 
foreign investors (Baltzer, Jank and Smajlbegovic 2019) have been offered to explain the 
anomaly on the behavioural basis. Economic and risk explanations for momentum are for 
example offered by Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) as they argued that industries may 
cause momentum, Maio and Philip (2018) offered economic activity and Garcia-Feijoo, 
Jensen and Jensen (2018) found that funding conditions could be explanations for it.   
Many of the explanations for momentum and other anomalies on the financial markets 
are based on the behavioural explanations and information, so these two have been taken 
to view of this thesis, especially the latter one, as information is widely an accepted factor 
that affects the prices of the assets (see e.g. efficient market hypotheses by Fama 1970). 
Therefore, economic and risk-based models are out of the scope of his thesis (see e.g. 
Asness et al. 2013, for discussion on risk-based explanations). Many of the largest mar-
kets in the world, for example the government bonds, oil and indices, adapts very quickly 
to new information, when the markets for smaller firms and firms with otherwise less 
attention adapts much slower (Hong and Stein 1999, Hong, Lim and Stein 2000). This 
gradual flow of information, as argued for example by Hong and Stein (1999) and Da et 
al. (2014), is one source of momentum.   
According to the efficient market hypotheses (Fama 1970), the changes in the asset prices 
are driven by the new information that arrives at the markets. Da et al. (2014) uses the 
frog-in-the-pan (FIP thereafter) anecdote to describe the effect of the limited information 
processing capacity. When the frog is put on the pot with boiling water, it would imme-
diately try to jump out of that pot, but if the water is slowly heated to the boiling point, 
the frog ignores the change in the temperature and slowly became cooked. This is the 
same that happens to investors as they notice some dramatic event, they immediately react 
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to that new information, but when the small changes happen during a longer period, it 
would be adapted much slower. 
Da et al. (2014) argues that, this is due to the limitations of investors’ attention and ability 
to process new information, investors do not recognize continuous gradual positive in-
formation that firms produce and hence underreact, which on the one hand, keeps the 
momentum going (see chapter 3.1 for complementary discussion). On the other hand, 
when the firm release sporadically extremely good news, that is they produce discrete 
information that attracts a lot of public, media and analyst coverage, lots of investors runs 
to trade on that information and causes them collectively to overreact on that information 
(Da et al. 2014). As a result, the evidence suggested by Da et al. (2014), the discrete 
information is more exposed to long-term reversals compared with continuous infor-
mation. 
Da et al. (2014) expressed that the investors capability to process information is main 
determiner of the k parameter, which measures the relative frequency of the information 
signals. Information is continuous whenever the signals are below k and discrete when 
the signals are above k. As the information processing limitations increases, the k also 
increases, which indicates that the investor is more likely to miss greater amount of con-
tinuous information. As there are no common way to measure investors information pro-
cessing capabilities, Da et al. (2014) used information discreteness as proxy. 
To measure information discreteness, Da et al. (2014) have come up with the Information 
discreteness measurements (ID). It measures the sign of the returns of the formation pe-
riod and how the returns are distributed to positive and negative days. If the formation 
period returns are mainly driven by certain sign return days, then the information is con-
tinuous. On the other hand, when the returns are constantly changing between positive 
and negative, the returns are more likely to be discrete.  
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1.1. Research question, hypothesis and contribution 
Traditional momentum strategies are based on purely the past returns of the asset no mat-
ter how volatile the past returns are. For example if we have two different return series of 
the stocks A and B, where A={2,2,2,2,2,2,2} and B={1,1,1,1,1,1,8}, it could be easily see 
that the return series of A is much smoother than B, and intuitively A could be expected 
to continue its smoother increase whereas B’s future prices have much more uncertainty, 
even though both series got the ID of -1. More discussion about ID measurement is on 
chapter 4.2. 
In the post 1980 sample period, Da et al. (2014) found that ID momentum produces 9,1 
percent (t-stat 6,35) six month return after portfolio construction in the lowest ID portfolio 
(i.e. the portfolio of the most continuous information) and 11,75 percent (t-stat 8,55) Fama 
and French Three-factor alpha. Following the methodology of Da et al. (2014) I form my 
hypothesis:   
H1: FIP momentum produce significant risk adjusted returns 
This thesis extends the recent academic research in two ways. First, the original paper 
byDa et al. (2014) focuses only on the US data, but I extend the research to the interna-
tional level as I use the European data. Second, I will test the strength of the anomaly 
after original publication. As argued by Mclean and Pontiff (2016), academic research 
seems to decrease or vanish the out-of-sample returns of the anomalies in the US, but 
according to Jacobs and Müller (2019) these anomalies stays strong outside of the US 
both out-of-sample and post-publication. My final contribution is to test whether the per-
formance of the FIP momentum differs with different formation- and holding periods, as 
Da et al. (2014) only focuses on the 6-month formation and holding period. 
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1.2. Structure of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is constructed as follows. In chapter two, theorethical background 
of the thesis is introduced. Chapter three, goes trough behavioral models behind the 
momentum. Data and methodology are outlined in chapter four and empirical findings 
are discussed in chapter five. Lastly, chapter six concludes the whole thesis and discusses 
more on the results. 
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2. THEORETHICAL BACKGROUND 
To better understand the possible explanations of the momentum, it is vital to under-stand 
the theoretical framework of the markets where the anomaly works and the framework 
how the assets in these markets are priced. It is practical to first understand how the mar-
kets should work in theory and have a reference point that can be used to compare how 
these potential violations deviate from the state that the theory offers. To do so, this chap-
ter first concentrates collectively on the market-wide efficiency and then move focus on 
the pricing and the returns of the individual assets. For example, findings by Celiker, 
Kayacetin, Kumar and Sonaer (2016) have shown that news about the cash flows, and the 
finding that changes in dividends (Asem 2009) are indeed very an important driver behind 
the momentum. 
2.1. Efficient market hypotheses 
The main function of the markets is to allocate the ownership of the economy’s capital 
stock (Fama 1970). In the completely efficient markets, the prices should reflect all avail-
able information. The most well-known theory of the market efficiency is the efficient 
market hypotheses introduced by Fama (1970). The efficient market hypotheses states 
that there are three different versions of the theory: weak form, semi-strong form and 
strong form. The main differences between the different forms are what kind of infor-
mation is already included in the prices (Fama 1970).  
On the weak form of the efficient market hypotheses, the market prices of the securities 
contain all historical information that is available at the time (Fama 1970). That means 
on the other words that the trading strategy, that uses the past prices of the security, should 
be unprofitable, which is not the case in reality as could be seen for example in the mo-
mentum strategy. The weak form of the efficient market hypotheses also drops the floor 
from the technical analysis and trend following strategies that uses the past performance 
of an asset as signals for profitable trading strategies. 
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Semi-strong form of the efficient market hypotheses states that the current market price 
of the securities fully reflects all public information that is available at the time, in addi-
tion to the information on the weak form. This form of the theory assumes that all the 
events and the information that will have an influence on the market price will be fully 
incorporated into the price of an asset immediately after the announcement of the event 
or the new information (Fama 1970). This leads to the situation where the markets should 
not have any under- or overreactions because the information adjusted prices of the assets 
should be on the right level, so the rational investors have no incentives to trade too much. 
The strongest form of the efficient market hypotheses suppose that the market price of an 
asset contains all possible information, both public and private, that is available at the 
time.  This form assumes that there are no expected exceed trading profits available for 
an individual investor, because of the investor’s superior insider information supply 
(Fama 1970). As Fama (1970: 409) has pointed out that this form is not “an exact form 
of reality”, but more like an ideal state of the world that could be used to test the deviations 
from it, for example to test whether an individual investor or a group of investors will 
have access to private information.  
As a result of the practical limitations of Fama’s (1970) different forms of the market 
efficiency, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) offered an alternative argument that the markets 
cannot be fully efficient and reflect all available information. Their main argument against 
the efficient market hypotheses is that the price of the information costly. They argued 
that if the markets would be fully efficient, that is the prices contains all available infor-
mation, and the information is costly, then no-one has incentive to acquire information. 
If no-one acquires the information, then there will not be any “informed investors” who 
will trade, and if there are no trading, how the prices of the securities could contain any 
information? (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980.) 
It seems to be that the arguments against the efficient market hypotheses are quite robust, 
but they still leave an open question how then it is so difficult to beat the markets?  Malkiel 
(2003) have concluded many studies of the performance of the mutual funds and discov-
ered that the performance of the mutual funds is neither consistent, nor they can outper-
form the markets. For example, many funds that are outperformed the index in the 1980’s 
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were underperformer in the 1990’s. Also, it was discovered that the studies about the 
performance of the mutual funds are biased because of the survivorship bias. (Malkiel 
2003.) 
The main arguments against the efficient market hypotheses are the anomalies, or in the 
other words, predictable patterns that seem to outperform the markets in-the-sample. 
However, as found by Mclean and Pontiff (2016), the out-of-sample performance of most 
anomalies are much lower than in-the-sample, and the performance get even worse after 
the publication of the article that introduces the anomaly.  They found that on average the 
out-of-sample performance in 26 percent lower than in the sample, and even 58 percent 
lower after the publication (Mclean and Pontiff 2016).  
The academic debate for and against the efficient market hypotheses is endless swamp 
where no right answer would never be found. As Fama (1970) pointed out that the strong-
est form of the hypothesis is clearly false, but he raised a question in his updated paper 
on efficient market hypotheses (1991) that it is impossible to test pure efficiency in the 
markets. All the tests that have been done are done with the different forms of equilibrium 
models. The question Fama (1991) raised is the market inefficient or are the models 
wrong, that tries to break down the efficient market hypotheses?  
To conclude, Malkiel (2003) pointed out that the markets can sometimes deviate from the 
efficient levels, but in the long run it will always reverse back to where the market is 
efficient. Also, both Malkiel (2003) and Fama (1991) accepted the fact that there are fac-
tors that clearly prevent the markets be fully efficient, for example the cost of information 
and trading. In addition, Mclean and Pontiff (2016) concluded that post publication ex-
pected returns are the highest on trading strategies that are costly to implement in practice, 
which potentially could explain the consistence in the momentum strategies that involves 
of trading of hundreds or thousands of stocks both long and short. This leaves the spot in 
theory, that allows the information based FIP momentum to be at least profitable on the 
theoretical level. 
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2.2. Stock pricing models 
Dividend discount model 
The assumptions of the dividend discount models are that the current value of the com-
mon share is the present value of its expected future dividends. The equation 1 presents 
the simple dividend discount model, where the price of the stock at time t, Pt, is the per-
petual sum of its expected dividends at time t+1, and every paid dividend is discounted 
with the discount factor (1+r) t, where r is the average of the expected return of the stock 
or internal rate of return on expected dividends (Fama and French 2015).  
(1)    𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡+1) (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡⁄∞𝑡=1   
This simple model takes dividends as taken and does not take a stand on the changes in 
dividends. It also assumes that the expected future dividends reflect a possible change in 
market value and in other meaningful factors that affect the market value of the stock 
(Bodie et al. 2014). The model also shows that if two companies have the same expected 
dividends, but different market prices, from equation 1, it could be seen that the firm with 
lower market value has the higher expected rate of return.  
If it could be unrealistically expected that the dividends paid by the stock will grow with 
the steady rate of g, the model 1 could be modified to following form, where other factors 
are as in the model 2 (Bodie et al. 2014). 
 (2)    𝑃𝑡 = 𝐸(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡+1) 𝑟 − 𝑔⁄  
For practical reason, usually dividends can be estimated with moderate accuracy over a 
medium period of time and then the dividends are expected to grow with steady rate g. 
This can be interpreted with combining models 1 and 2 to get a model 3. For illustrative 
purpose, four years of expected dividends are used.  
(3)  𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸(𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑡) (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡⁄3𝑡=1 + 1 (1 + 𝑟)
3⁄ ∗  𝐸(𝐷𝐼𝑉4) 𝑟 − 𝑔⁄    
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Dividends and especially changes in the dividend policies are very followed and expected 
information that the firms have to publish regularly. Analysts try to predict them as accu-
rately as possible, investors are allocating their wealth based on the pay-out policies and 
financial media tries to publish news and analysis based on the announcements, so it is 
easy to understand the importance of them in the information-based momentum strategy. 
To have an example of a different type of information, let’s consider two types of firms: 
firms that have very long and steady dividend growth history, or so-called dividend-aris-
tocrats, and firms that have never paid any dividends. If these dividend-aristocrats an-
nounces that next year their dividend will grow with the expected steady rate, the markets 
are not expected to react to the announcement strongly. On the other hand, if these non-
paying firms announce that their they start to pay dividends, the market reaction would 
be much stronger and the probability to overreaction is much stronger.   
Free cash flow models 
A free cash flow is the cash flow produced by the company which it can pay out to its 
investors when the investments, which are necessary to the growth of the company, have 
been made. The model could be seen as an extension of the dividend discount model as 
it also takes into the consideration of the cash flows of the company that the company 
itself invests, which are important to the future growth of the company. The model does 
not take into consideration how much the company pays dividends or buys its own shares 
back, but rather it tells the limits within these actions can be made (Brealey et al. 2017). 
The free cash flow model is especially useful for evaluating companies that do not pay 
dividends such as smaller growth firms. 
The free cash flow model can be used to evaluate the price of the equity capital or the 
whole company. If only the equity capital is used, then the free cash flow is discounted 
with the cost of equity and if the whole company is evaluated then the cash flows are 
discounted with the weighted average cost of capital which takes the after-tax cost of debt 
into consideration. In the model 4, E(FCFt+1) denotes the expected free cash flow at the 
time t+1 and WACC is the weighted average cost of capital, which is expressed at the 
model 5 
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(4)   𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸(𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡+1) (1 + 𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶)
𝑡⁄∞𝑡=1  
(5)   𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = (1 − 𝑇𝑐) ∗ 𝑟𝑑 ∗ 𝐷/𝑉 + 𝑟𝑒 ∗ 𝐸/𝑉, 
Where Tc is the company’s tax rate, rd is the after-tax cost of debt, D is outstanding debt, 
re is the cost of equity capital, E is the outstanding equity capital and V is the sum of D 
and E. 
The same logic behind the importance of dividends applies to the cash flow models, be-
cause the cash flows are very important part in the equity valuation. Many equity valua-
tion models are mainly based on the information about the financial statements, which 
are the mandatory announcements that are required by law. Also, all the public companies 
have an obligation to inform all the information that a rational investor would use to make 
investment decisions (Market Abuse Regulation 2014/596). It is easy to see that the cash 
flows and dividends, in addition to information that affects previous two are very closely 
followed by investors and financial media, which are the main users and distributors of 
the new information. As the FIP momentum is based on the information discreteness of 
the firms, all the changes in the information produced by firms are potential sources of 
the overreaction that the strategy tries to avoid. 
2.3. Asset pricing models 
Capital Asset Pricing Model  
According to Brealey et al. (2017:888), Capital Asset Pricing model by Sharpe (1964) 
and Lintner (1965) is one of most important theories of modern finance. The model works 
as a link between the expected return and systemic risk of a stock, where the excess return 
over the risk-free rate of a stock is its beta times markets risk premium. The model is 
expressed in the model 6:  
(6)    𝑅𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) 
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Where Ri is the return of a stock, rf is the risk-free rate, βi is the beta coefficient of stock i 
and Rm is the return of a market. 
The assumptions behind the model are listed below and one can see that these are very 
unrealistic, so these assumptions should be seen more like a benchmark of the perfect 
capital markets. Also, as discussed in the market efficiency chapter, the model clearly 
fails to price stocks at least partly due to concerns raised by for example, Black, Jensen 
and Scholes (1972) and Fama (1991), but it is still widely used among practitioners (Bodie 
et al. 2014). 
1. Investors are rational portfolio optimizers 
2. All investors have same investing horizon and homogenous expectations  
3. Investors can lend and borrow at a steady risk-free rate 
4. All assets are publicly held, and all securities could be traded 
5. Short selling is allowed 
6. All information is public 
7. There are no transaction costs or taxes 
None of the assumptions are true, for example investors are not rational as they tend to 
under- and overreact to different types of news, investors tend to have very different in-
vestment horizons, and investment loans are not available for everyone neither are short 
selling. Also, the main component of the model, the beta coefficient, is not forecasting 
the average returns correctly as low beta stocks earns higher average return than higher 
beta stocks (Black et al. 1972) and it is time varying (Bollerslev, Engle and Wooldridge 
1988). Even though the strict assumptions drop the floor behind the model, it is still one 
of the most important factors of the more up-to-date asset pricing models for example, 
Fama’s and French’s three and five factor models (1993 and 2015), which tries to explain 
the average returns that CAPM left unexplained.  
Fama and French 3 factor model 
Three factor model by Fama and French (1993) is an extension of the traditional capital 
asset pricing model, where the returns of the assets are explained, in addition to market 
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risk premium, with the size factor and book-value factor. The size factor (SMB, Small 
minus big) is the difference between the returns of the portfolio of small firms and large 
firms. The book-value factor (HML, High minus low) is the difference between the re-
turns of the portfolio of the high book-to-market firms and low book-to-market firms. The 
model is expressed as in the equation 7: 
(7)  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑟𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where the left-hand side is the excess return of the asset i at time t, α is the abnormal 
return of the asset i, βi,m is the loading of the market factor, si is the loading to size factor, 
hi, is the loading to book-value factor and ɛ is a residual term with zero mean. 
Fama and French (1993) used the median NYSE market capitalization as break points to 
define the different size portfolios. Fama and French (1993) added the size factor to their 
model, as it was discovered that the size of the firm is explaining the returns (see Banz 
1981 for original discussion). Especially, the returns of smaller firms were a challenge 
for the traditional Capital asset pricing model, which was the motivation to add the size 
factor as proxy for the common risk factor in their asset pricing model (Fama and French 
1993).  
Fama and French (1992) found that book-equity-to-market (B/M) seems to have an ex-
planatory power on average stock returns, and especially combined with the size factor, 
they are explaining other factors, such as earnings per share (E/P) and leverage, that tries 
to explain average returns in the stock markets.  Fama and French (1992) argued that all 
of these four studied factors, B/M, size, E/P and leverage are all scaled versions of price 
of a stock, so some of them must be redundant. In the multivariate tests the relation with 
average returns and B/M and size stayed robust after the inclusion of other tested factors 
(Fama and French 1992). 
Size and B/M factors are closely related to momentum strategy. Momentum is found to 
be stronger among smaller firms (see e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman 1993 and 2001, Hong et 
al. 2000). This finding implies that if the FIP momentum portfolios are also driven by 
smaller firms, the strategy should load strongly on that factor. Also, as found by Jegadeesh 
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and Titman (2001), the long leg of 6/6 momentum portfolio has smaller loading than the 
short leg, which implies that short leg is driven by smaller firms. One argumentation be-
hind the relative strength of the smaller firms in momentum strategy is that they are not 
so widely followed by analysts and informed investors and therefore the information they 
produce are less effectively spread across the markets (Hong et al. 2000).  
Value strategy, or the strategy that buys low B/M stocks or long-term losers, is an oppo-
site view of the momentum strategy that buys and sells the short-term movers. The prof-
itability of the value strategy has been confirmed many times (see e.g. Fama and French 
1992) and it is working very well with the momentum strategy across different asset clas-
ses, as these two strategies are negatively correlated (Asness et al. 2013). Interestingly, 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) found that both extreme winners are losers both loads neg-
atively to B/M factor, compared with “middle” portfolios that load positively. This indi-
cates that extreme portfolios are more driven by growth firms (low B/M) than value firms 
(high B/M). Reactions to all Fama and French (1993) factors implies that the short side 
of the momentum strategy is riskier, as it loads more strongly on all Fama and French 
factors compared long side (Jegadeesh and Titman 2001). 
Fama and French 5 factor model 
If the asset pricing model prices all the assets correctly, the α of the model should be zero 
for all securities and portfolios that the model tries to price. Unfortunately, Fama and 
French (1993) three factor model fails price the variations caused by the profitability and 
investments of the companies. Due to this mispricing, Fama and French (2015) added two 
new factors for their asset pricing model: profitability and investment factors. The prof-
itability factor is the difference of the diversified portfolio of robustly and weakly profit-
able firms and investment factor is the difference between the portfolios of conservatively 
investing firms and aggressively investing firms. Five factor model is presented in the 
equation 8: 
(8) 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑟𝑓)𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑖 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
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Where the other factors are as in the equation 7, but ri is the loading of profitability factor 
and ci is the loading of the investment factor. (Fama and French 2015.)  
To understand the logic and importance of two new factors, the dividend discount model 
1 could be extended to take into account of equity earnings per share at time t, Yt, and the 
change in book equity, dBt, where we got that expected dividends at time t+1 are the 
expected equity earnings per share minus the change in the book equity (Fama and French 
2006). Model 1 is now 9, which is more precise: 
(9)    𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+1 − 𝑑𝐵𝑡+1) (1 + 𝑟)
𝑡⁄∞𝑡=1  
If both sides of model 9 are divided with book equity at time t  ¸we got the model 10, 
where it is easily seen that market-to-book-equity, is dependent from the profitability of 
the firm (equity earnings per share) and the investments of the firm (change in the book 
equity). For more precise discussion about the model could be found from Fama and 
French (2006). 
(10)    
𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑡
=
∑ 𝐸(𝑌𝑡+1−𝑑𝐵𝑡+1) (1+𝑟)
𝑡⁄∞𝑡=1
𝐵𝑡
 
Gross profitability or revenues minus costs of goods sold is discovered to be a very robust 
return factor and offers a good hedge against the traditional value factor, as these two 
strategies took the opposite views of the profitability of the assets. This is a result from 
the fact that traditional value strategy buys inexpensive assets when selling expensive 
assets, but in the gross profitability, it buys profitable assets and sells unprofitable assets. 
(Novy-Marx 2013.) 
It is argued that the “gross-profits is the cleanest accounting measure of true economic 
profitability” (Novy-Marx 2013: 2) and therefore tells more about the future profitability 
of the firm, even though the net profits of the firm might be much smaller than the com-
petitors. Novy-Marx (2013) argues that highly gross-profitable firms could have, for ex-
ample, much higher research and development or advertisement expenses than its more 
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net-profitable competitors. These expenses are closely related to future bottom line prof-
its. (Novy-Marx 2013.) 
The expected investments of the firms are negatively correlated with the expected future 
returns. Theoretically, this can be derived from the model 10 as there is four term in the 
extended dividend discount model: expected profitability (Y), expected investments (dB), 
B/M (inverse of P/B) and the expected return of the firm (r). When profitability and B/M 
terms are fixed, then increase in expected return decreases the expected investments by 
the firm. This negative correlation between two variables is confirmed empirically for 
example, by Titman, Wei and Xie (2004) and Ahorani, Grundy and Zeng (2013). 
For example, Chen, Yu and Wang (2018) tested how “plain momentum” loads on five 
factors. On all firm samples, both profitability and investment factors are redundant with 
t-values of -0,11 for RMW and 0.77 for CMA. Interestingly, for large firms only, RMW 
become important with the loading of -0.21 and t-value of -2.09 indicating that momen-
tum is more driven by weakly profitable firms. On the other hand, small firms load posi-
tively on the investment factor with factor loading of 0,3 with t-value of 2.39, indicating 
that smaller firms invest conservatively. Other factors behavior is mostly in line with 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001).   
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3. BEHAVIORAL EXPLANATIONS 
The next chapter focuses on investors psychology to understand the information pro-
cessing and behavioural return drivers behind the stock markets anomalies. Especially the 
FIP momentum is mainly driven by behavioural biases, especially under- and overreac-
tions, it is mandatory to understand the theory behind these biases. Therefore, the research 
on behavioural finance is taken as a view in this chapter and risk-based explanations have 
less weight. While some of the covered theories are not directly linked to already known 
explanations of the momentum, they are still covered as it widens the view in the topic 
and possibly offers not yet offered explains to anomaly.  
3.1. Under and overreactions 
Predictable short to medium and longer run return patterns has been in the interest of the 
financial academia and these patterns are tried to be explained with traditional asset pric-
ing models. Traditional models have clearly failed to explain these patterns so new angles 
have been taken. For example, Hong and Stein (1999) took a behavioral view on the topic, 
as they came up with theory about how the heterogenous agents interact with each other’s. 
Their goal was not to model the psychology of the agents and took the cognitive bias as 
taken. To model the interaction between different types of investors, they split the inves-
tor population to two types of investors: the newswatchers and momentum traders. The 
main difference between two types of investors is that newswatchers trades based on the 
changes of the fundamentals or when new information arrives, and momentum traders’ 
trades only based on the prior price changes of the asset (Hong and Stain 1999.) 
Neither of these investors’ types is fully rational as expected by traditional models. Ra-
ther, in their model, investors irrationality is due to limited capability to process public 
information and how they react to it. Newswatchers trades are based on forecasts that they 
have done from the news about the future values of the fundamentals and they do not give 
a weight to the price of the stock. Momentum traders are opposite as they cannot process 
any fundamental data and their forecast are based purely on the simple changes of past 
prices (Hong and Stain 1999.)  
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In the model, Hong and Stein (1999) assumed that new information diffuses slowly within 
the newswatchers and the speed how the new information diffuse, differs on how many 
newswatchers there are. They used a residual analyst coverage after size control as the 
proxy of the information flow. Hong and Stein (1999) discovered that momentum is in 
fact more profitable and the effect lasts longer within the stocks with the lowest infor-
mation flow. This indicates that when the information flow is slow the markets tend to 
underreact at first. This major underreaction, on the one hand, attracts the momentum 
traders and when more momentum traders rush to trade, on the other hand, makes them 
collectively to overreact. Authors argued that the profitability of the momentum strategies 
depends on how early on the “momentum cycle” the traders jump in. On the earlier stages 
of the cycle, momentum traders are reacting to initial underreaction of new information 
and on the later stages’ traders are reacting on the price changes caused by early birds, 
which is the reasoning to overreaction (Hong and Stain 1999.) 
The gradual flow of information could be seen as a part of the wider concept of the disa-
greement of the information or disagreement models (Hong and Stein 2007). Disagree-
ment models are based on three different psychological mechanisms: gradual information 
flow, limited attention and heterogenous priors. Even though these different mechanisms 
are based on different theoretical and empirical concepts, they still share common factors. 
The main features of these models are the importance of the differences in the investor’s 
beliefs. Hong and Stein (2007) argued the importance of these disagreement models in a 
following way: as a majority of the traditional pricing models clearly fails to explain most 
of the trading volume, there has to be some other factors that explains the volume, which 
according to Hong and Stein (2007), is the disagreement about the value of the stocks. 
In the 2007 article, Hong and Stein took the views of the original 1999 article even further 
when they introduced two new types of investors: specialists and generalist. They used 
the analysis by Huberman and Regev (2001) as an extreme example of the gradual flow 
of information among the different types of the investors. On the example, a small bio-
technology firm was mentioned in the front-page story on New York Times (NYT) that 
was about the break-through in cancer research. This story made the price of the firm 
rocketing from 12$ to 52$ per share. The most interesting part of the example was that 
this story contained 5-month-old information, as that research was originally published 
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in a scientific journal five months before the story in NYT. This original publication made 
the stock price move higher, but actual rocketing happened only after the NYT story (Hu-
berman and Regev 2001). Hong and Stein (2007) suggested that investors who reacted to 
the original publication were the specialists and those who rushed to trade after the NYT 
story was the generalists. 
The limited attention model assumes that investors are not able to process all available 
in-formation because they are “cognitively-overloaded” and thereby they only pay atten-
tion to a small set of available information (Hong and Stein 2007). Even though limited 
attention is closely related to gradual information flow, but it pays less attention to the 
dynamics of the diffusion of the information.  As argued by Hong and Stein (2007), the 
importance of the media is closely linked to limited attention as the “attention-grabbing” 
news release will increase the trading volume more than its less sensational but equal 
content news. Hong and Stein (2007) also used an article by DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) 
as an example of limited attention. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) found that trading vol-
ume after earnings announcements on Fridays are lower than on other days of the week, 
which suggest that investors are underreacting to this news because the weekend disrupts 
their attention. 
Third part of the disagreement model, introduced by Hong and Stein (2007), is the heter-
ogenous priors. Heterogenous priors mean that even though investors might get the same 
public information at the same time, their beliefs about the contained information might 
differ a lot. As an example Hong and Stein (2007: 121) used three investors with different 
expectations about the firm earnings announcement. Suppose that the earnings are 10 
percent and the investors have the following expectations: first expected no increase, sec-
ond expected 10 percent increase and third expected 20 percent increase. From the exam-
ple, it can be seen that for one investor, earnings were a positive surprise and for another 
it was negative surprise. Every one of these investors has to up-date their models and 
therefore they have to trade with each other. This, on the other hand, increases the trading 
volume on the markets. This is the total opposite compared with traditional rational agent 
models (see e.g. chapter 2), where the new information should decrease disagreement 
among investors (Hong and Stein 2007.) 
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As already pointed out by Hong and Stein (1999 & 2007), different investors have differ-
ent beliefs and expectations of the information on certain stocks. According to the Bayes-
ian framework, investors’ expectations and beliefs will be updated based on their earlier 
beliefs in addition to new information. The process how this update will happen depends 
on how strong the uncertainty of prior beliefs is and how uncertain is the new information. 
Heterogeneity of these beliefs, as measured by the dispersion of analyst forecasts of earn-
ings, is shown to be robust predictor of the momentum returns, since the monthly differ-
ence between high and low dispersed momentum portfolios is 0,55 per-cent with t-statis-
tic of 3.59. Also, it was found that loser stocks have higher heterogeneity of beliefs com-
pared to winners (Verardo 2009.) 
When Hong and Stein (1999 & 2007) studied how the heterogenous agents interacts with 
each other, Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) took a different view as they 
formed a theory of the markets over- and underreacts to new information about how these 
reactions are derived from overconfidence and biased self-attribution. They defined an 
overconfident investor as a person who overestimates his forecasts that are based on the 
private information signals. These private signals are either confirmed or disconfirmed 
after the public information is announced, and depending of the outcome, his confidence 
will overly rise or fall only slightly. This asymmetry between the results of the confirming 
and disconfirming public information is called biased self-attribution (Daniel et al. 1998.) 
This overconfidence on private signals is causing the stock markets first to overreact and 
when the noisy public information signals arrive, only a part of that initial overreaction is 
corrected, which leads to delayed underreaction. This “overreaction-underreaction” pat-
tern is, for example, linked to negative long-run autocorrelations and unconditional ex-
cess volatility. On the other hand, if this noisy public information confirms, on average, 
more than disconfirms the private signals, it could trigger the continuation in initial over-
reaction, which is linked to positive short-run autocorrelations (momentum) before the 
delayed reversal (Daniel et al. 1998.) 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) extended the behavioral finance literature by intro-
ducing their model for investor sentiment. Their investor sentiment model explains both 
under- and overreactions and it is based on two psychological theories: representativeness 
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and conservatism. Compared with for example Daniel et al. (1998), investor sentiment 
model first assumes that investors underreact to news, but as this news are forming the 
same sing patterns, investors overreacting to these, as they overly optimistically expect 
them to continue even though if it is highly improbable (Barberis et al. 1998.) 
First psychological model Barberis et al. (1998) used is conservatism, first introduced by 
Edwards (1968), that is a psychological theory, in which individuals slowly adapts their 
beliefs when they find new evidence. In the concept of Barberis et al. (1998), when in-
vestors get new information, they update their models correctly, but too little compared 
to “rational benchmark”, which causes them to collectively underreact and therefore 
drives the momentum further. The second model, introduced by Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), is the representative heuristic, which one “manifestation” is that people seem to 
see patterns in random data. Barberis et al. (1998) suggest that this representativeness is 
the reasoning behind the long-term reversals as investors do not face the fact that long 
streaks of same sing news cannot continue forever.  
The investor sentiment model assumes that earnings or other corporate information fol-
lows a random walk, but the investor is not aware of that. The investor believes that these 
earnings are moving between two different regimes, where the first regime is a state where 
earnings are “mean-reverting” and the second regime is a state where the earnings are 
trending. The probability to move from one regime to another is fixed in the investors 
mind. The model also assumes that at any point of time, the earnings of the firm are more 
probably staying in one regime than change. Every time new earnings announcement is 
released, the investor uses this new information to update his beliefs about the regime 
where he is. (Barberis et al. 1998.) 
3.2.  Cultural differences 
Behavioural biases that investors face (see e.g. Daniel et al. 1998, Barberis et. al. 1998 
and Hong and Stein 1999), could be caused by differences in cultures where the investors 
live and therefore this cultural environment is a potential factor that affects stock returns 
(Chui et al. 2010).  As proxy for the cultural environment, authors studied how the 
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Hofstede’s (2001) individualism index explains the returns of the momentum strategy. 
Chui et al. (2010) argued that individualism is closely related to overconfidence and self-
attribution bias, which has been shown to be a potential driver in momentum returns 
(Daniel et al. 1998). Also, some Asian countries have caused problems to the momentum 
(see e.g. Asness et al. 2013) and at the same time these countries have lower index values 
compared with western countries, which is the motivation of the study (Chui et al. 2010). 
The individualism index is significant predictor of the momentum returns as the differ-
ence between the highest and lowest 30 percent individualistic countries is 0.65 percent 
per month with t-statistic of 4.3. These results are very robust, as they also compared 
other country-related measurements that might explain the results, such as economic de-
velopment, information uncertainty and development and integrity of the country’s finan-
cial markets, and still found that the individualism stay significant momentum returns 
explanator. Findings hold even after excluding these Asian countries or including only 
developed countries. Also, there seems to be long-term reversals in the momentum port-
folios (see e.g. Daniel et al. 1998 and Hong and Stein 1999 for behavioural models), these 
reversals are stronger on more individualistic countries (Chui et al. 2010.) 
3.3. Investors attention 
Investors’ attention is an important part of the decision-making process, as already briefly 
discussed in chapter 3.1. But how individual and institutional investors decide what stocks 
they buy or sell? Barber and Odean (2008) offers a view that stock that attracts individual 
investors’ attention is more likely to be bought than sold, compared with the institutional 
investors, where both actions are equal likely. This difference between two types of in-
vestors is resulted from the fact that buying, and selling are fundamentally two different 
actions, as opposed to the views of the traditional models. This difference is also more 
meaningful to individual investors, as they face more search problems and constraints 
(Barder and Odean 2008.) 
Investors have limited cognitive resources and therefore they cannot process all available 
information. Consequently, investors tend to focus on the stocks that have attracted their 
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attention in some way, as there is cognitively an efficient way to reduce that potential 
universe of stocks to buy. On the other hand, when they face a situation, where stocks 
have to be sold, the universe is mostly the stocks that the investor already owns, so the 
“attention-crabbing” is not so important factor than for example the past returns of the 
stocks (Shefrin and Statman 1985). They found that the actual buying behaviour of indi-
vidual investors is what was expected, as on the most attention attracting days individuals 
are the net buyers, when the “attention-crabbing” was measured by trading volume, ex-
treme price changes and news coverage (Barder and Odean 2008.) 
Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) took on a different view on the investors’ attention and 
used Googles Search Volume Index (SVI) as proxy for the direct attention of certain 
stocks, compared more indirect measures used by Barber and Odean (2008). Da et al. 
(2011) argued that their proxy is more precise than other indirect measures, as for exam-
ple stock returns and trading volumes could be related to other factors than attention, and 
even though some firm might be in a news article, it does not guarantee that the investor 
will actually read it. This is not the case with SVI, where the searcher of the information 
is unquestionably paying attention on the subject of the search (Da et al. 2011.) 
SVI is especially a good attention indicator among individual investors, as found in the 
difference between changes in SVI and trading behaviour of the investors. As founded 
from the retail execution reports from Security and Exchange Commission, Individual 
investors tend to concentrate on specific market centres compared with more sophisti-
cated investors. They also confirmed the hypothesis of Barber and Odean (2008) that 
individual investors are the net buyers among the “attention-crabbing” stocks, as they 
found that the stocks with a high increase in abnormal SVI outperform their peers more 
than 30 basis point during two weeks after the increase. It was also founded that this effect 
is stronger on stock that are more traded by individual investors and by the end of the 
year that initial price pressure is almost completely reversed (Da et al. 2011).  
When Da et al. (2011) looked at the investor attention from the view of an individual 
investor, Ben-Rephael, Da and Israelsen (2017) extended the investor attention literature 
to cover institutional investors. Individual investors mostly rely on free information 
sources like Google when institutional investors use more sophisticated information 
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sources as for example Bloomberg or Thomson Reuters. Azi et al. (2017) used user pro-
files from Bloomberg Terminal as their proxy for the investors’ attention and came up 
with the abnormal institutional attention (AIA) as a measurement that captures attention 
by institutional investors.  
To get the best possible comparativeness with Da et al. (2011), Ben-Rephael et al. (2017) 
used a very similar sample. They found that both measurements (SVI and AIA) are posi-
tively and significantly correlated, but still only explains about 2 percent of each other’s 
variation. Then, AIA is more correlated with institutional trading volume than total trad-
ing volume, which indicates that AIA measures directly institutional investors’ attention. 
Also, it was founded that AIA actually leads the SVI, what underlines the fact that insti-
tutional investors have more resources and incentive to more quickly pay attention to new 
information.  
AIA is also very good predictor of the underreactions on the new information as institu-
tional investors are those who tries to react more quickly, trade more and are less con-
strained than retail investors. Ben-Rephael et al. (2017) discovered that when new infor-
mation does not attract the attention of institutional investors, prices are more likely to 
exhibit patterns, for example post-announcement drifts, that are related to underreaction. 
They found that the strategy, that goes long on positive news and short on negative news 
on days that does not attract attention, could generate 63 to 95 basis points significant 
returns over five to ten days after the news, compared with opposite strategy, where the 
returns are not significant. This finding confirms that underreactions are driven by limited 
attention (Ben-Rephael et al. 2017.) 
Investors have clearly limited capacity to process information and therefore paying atten-
tion only on certain types of information. There are still a lot of other factors, in addition 
on economic factors, that disrupt the attention of investors. Huang, Huang and Lin (2019) 
founded that large national lottery jackpots attracts a lot of individual investors’ attention 
and therefore causes the markets to pay less attention on firm level information. Peress 
and Schimdt (2018) had similar findings when they studied the effects of sensational news 
on stock markets. They found that on days with sensational news, for example trading 
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activity and liquidity was much smaller in comparison with other days (Peress and 
Schmidt 2018).  
Investors' moods have an effect on investors’ attention. For example, sport sentiments can 
also distract the investors' mood, as was founded by Edmans, Carcìa and Norli (2007). 
They found that international soccer games have economically and significant effects on 
stock markets for example, especially when losing an important match on important 
games (Edmans, Carcìa and Norli 2007). Also, the weather has an impact on a mood. 
Sunshine has significant effect, as there is a negative relationship between cloudiness and 
stock returns, even after controlling other weather conditions (Hirshleifer and Shumway 
2003). 
In addition, that different types of investors react on different types of information with a 
different degree, this investors’ attention is also influenced by seasonal patterns. There is 
not just a constant degree of attention that is given to specific type on information at 
certain time, if the information content exceeds some unit of information. Liu and Peng 
(2015) pointed out that investors’ attention is strongly following seasonal patterns as Fri-
days and summer holidays (July and August) exhibit predictable reactions when meas-
ured by “abnormal attention”.  
On Fridays, investors’ pay much less attention to earnings announcements compared with 
other trading days of the week, even after controlling that there are less announcements 
and less “baseline attention” on Fridays. This Friday pattern is in line with the findings 
of DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). Summer months have a similar pattern, as attention is 
significantly much lower during these months even when July is the seconds busiest earn-
ing announcement month. Interestingly, even though the baseline attention is lower on 
these summer holiday months, reactions between announcement days and non-announce-
ments days do not differ from other months (Liu and Peng 2015.) 
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3.4. Seosanality of stock returns and momentum 
Even though financial markets do not sleep during the summer months, there is still strong 
evidence that many participants are “gone fishin’” as suggested by Hong and Yu (2009). 
They studied trading activity and mean returns during the summer holiday months (3rd 
quarter on the Northern Hemisphere and 1st quarter on the Southern Hemi-sphere) around 
the world and discovered that both measures are significantly lower during these months. 
Especially, these findings were the strongest among the largest markets in Northern 
America and Europe. It was also discovered that lower activity and returns are in fact due 
to summer vacations, as air-travel passenger travel and hotel occupancy rates predicted 
significantly well the summer month dummy, which on the other hand, was significant 
variable explaining both trading activity and mean returns. Hong and Yu (2009) argued 
that their “Gone fishin’” effect is related to “Sell in May and Go Away” effect by Bouman 
and Jacobsen (2002), as both studies found that trading activity is in fact lower during 
summer months. 
One important driver behind the annual seasonal patterns on the stock markets is well 
known psychological disorder called seasonal affective disorder (SAD) or more com-
monly known from its milder version: winter blue (Kamstra, Kramer and Levi 2003). 
Many psychological studies have shown that SAD is closely related to the length of the 
day and to many depression symptoms, which on the other hand are linked to risk-aver-
sion and “sensation-seeking” propensity (see Kamstra et al. 2003) for more discussion). 
Interestingly, there are strong evidences that the effects of SAD are asymmetrically dis-
tributed around the winter solstice. Kamstra et al. (2003) argued that during the fall period 
investors who are affected by SAD reduce the riskiness of their portfolios and moving 
their wealth to the safer assets, as the length of the day is decreasing. Around the winter 
solstice, when the length of the day starts to again increase, which boosts the mood of the 
investors, and they again move their wealth back to riskier assets, that is linked to higher 
returns on the markets (Kamstra et al. 2003).  
Findings by Kamstra et al. (2003) supports this argue, as the SAD has positive and sig-
nificant impact on the mean returns, but the fall dummy decreases as one move further 
away from the equator, for example Sweden (59 degrees north) has lower value than 
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Germany (50 degrees north) and New Zealand (37 degrees south) has lower value than 
South Africa (26 degrees south). Also, when the risk-aversion is linked to SAD effect, 
then an asset pricing model, that allows a price of the risk vary, should capture SAD 
effect. This, indeed, is the case as when the conditional capital asset pricing model that 
allows time-varying in market risk and in price of risk captures the SAD effect completely 
(Garret, Kamstra and Kramer 2005). 
As there are clearly behavioural factors that cause seasonal patterns in the stock markets, 
how these patterns exploit trading opportunities? For example, Heston and Sadka (2008) 
found that if a stock has above-average return on a specific month, this same month tend 
to have above-average returns at annual intervals. Also, the January effect has been 
founded to be very consistent calendar anomaly (see e.g. Moller and Zilca 2008 for dis-
cussion on the January effect) that have affected other stock market anomalies such as the 
momentum (e.g. Jegadeesh and Titman 1993 & 2001) and long-term reversals (De Bondt 
and Thaler 1985 & 1987). For example, Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) found that momen-
tum have an average -1,69 percent (t=-2,49) return on Januaries, when in between Febru-
ary and December an average return is 1.26 percent (t= 8.31). 
Yao (2012) took a closer look on the January effect as he studies what kind of impact it 
has on momentum. Two different formation periods are used in the study, as short-term 
(t-2 to t -6) and intermediate-term (t-7 to t-12) momentum strategies were studied sepa-
rately. One of the main findings was that these two different strategies have a different 
exposure to differently sized stocks, as the short-term momentum is more exposed to size 
effect than the intermediate-term strategy on January. Also, January has strong negative 
autocorrelation and non-January months has strong positive autocorrelations, which un-
derlines the well-known fact that the momentum loses money on Januaries. In addition, 
Yao (2012) found that, after controlling the January effect, intermediate-term autocorre-
lation seems to disappear, which might be one of the reasons why it is an established 
practice in momentum literature to use a prior 6-month returns.  
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3.5. Some evidence from the behavioral models  
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) extended their earlier (1993) research to study more closely 
potential explanations for momentum and to tackle the questions about the reliability of 
the results. As the extended momentum returns are consistent with the earlier work, they 
focused more on reversals and how it could be explained by different theories. For exam-
ple, behavioral theories by Barberis et al. (1998), Daniel et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein 
(1999) all predict that there is a return reversal after the intermediate holding periods. 
This is what Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) indeed found, as cumulative momentum re-
turns are on average negative 13 to 60 months after the formation date (ranges from -0,13 
percent per month with t-statistic of -1,93 to -0,38 percent per month with t-statistic of -
4,45). Also, this reversal effect is stronger among smaller firms and weaker among larger 
firms, which on the other hand, is consistent with the momentum as the effect is stronger 
among smaller firms. This small firm dominance in the momentum might be due to higher 
volatilities of these firms, so the extreme values are more likely among these firms 
(Jegadeesh and Titman 2001).  
Hong et al. (2000) tested the predictions of the gradual information flow model by Hong 
and Stein (1999) and found that momentum is stronger among small to medium size 
(peaking at the 3rd smallest decile) firms compared with the largest and the smallest firms, 
which is in line with the findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 & 2001). They also 
discovered, as predicted, that momentum is stronger among the firms that have low ana-
lyst coverage. The most interesting finding was that the firms with less analyst coverage 
seem to react stronger on the bad news than on the good news. For example, 1,05 percent 
of the monthly profitability of the total 1,43 percent came from the “losers” side of 3rd 
decile winner minus loser portfolio. They argued that this phenomenon might be due to 
the fact that when there is less or no analyst coverage, the executives of the firms are 
major spreader of the information. When the firm has something positive to announce 
(e.g. positive profit warning), then the executives are more likely to make much more 
noise about this news compared with the situation when the firm has something negative 
to announce (e.g. lawsuit), when they most likely announce only what is required by law 
(Hong et al. 2000.)  
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The model of the gradual flow of the information is also tested using the information from 
the option markets. Chen and Lu (2017) rationalized their approach by that the measures 
used by Hong et al. (2000) are static rather than dynamic, which is more the true nature 
of information diffusion speed. Chen and Lu (2017) used the growth of implied volatility 
of call options as proxy for the information diffusion. They argued that large moves in 
the implied volatility reflects the positions and beliefs of information of informed traders. 
Test portfolios are then formed by sorting stock with the largest growth or decline in 
implied volatility, where the “winners” were the stock with the highest growth and the 
“losers” were the stock with the largest decline. These enhanced portfolios generated 1,25 
to 1,78 percent monthly alphas after risk adjustments and are mainly driven by the long 
leg of the long-short portfolios, which is interestingly the opposite of the findings of Hong 
et al. (1998) (Chen and Lu 2017.) 
In addition to the past market data, momentum and reversals are also studied in the labor-
atory setting. Bloomfield, Tayler and Zhou (2009) established laboratory experiments that 
are based on the Hong and Stein’s (1999) model of the gradual flow of information, where 
they studied how informed and uninformed investors behave in different settings. Bloom-
field et al. (2009) observed that actual behavior of investors is mostly in line with the 
predictions by Hong and Stein’s (1999) model, as gradually spreading news is driving the 
momentum. They also discovered that long-term reversals arise when the uninformed 
investors make their trades, as they are overreacting to the new information. Even though 
the behavior patterns are in line with the model, the causes are not as Bloomfield et al. 
(2009) found that uninformed traders are behaving more like contrarians than momentum 
traders. Bloomfield et al. (2009: 2536) explained that this finding is due to the fact that 
“The uninformed traders’ contrarian reactions… lasts longer than the informed traders’ 
reaction…” and thereby getting prices starts to reverse. 
The media plays an important role in the stock markets as suggested by Hong and Stein 
(2007). Also, the importance of the information is shown to be an important factor in the 
momentum returns. In this context Hillert et al. (2014) studied how media coverage, 
measured by the number of articles on the specific firm in well-known newspapers, af-
fects the momentum returns. They found that over the six month holding period, the me-
dia-based momentum portfolio generated on average 1,02 percent (t=3,61) per month in 
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the highest covered decile portfolio compared with only 0,33 percent (t= 1,42) in the 
lowest covered decile portfolio, also the difference between the highest and the lowest 
decile portfolios is 0,68 percent with t-statistic 3,7. In addition, Hillert et al. (2014) found 
that the reversal effect is stronger among higher covered stocks, which indicates that this 
type of momentum is potentially driven by overconfidence, overreactions and limited at-
tention as, for example, suggested by Daniel et al. (1998), Barber and Odean (2008) and 
Da et al. (2011). 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the data and portfolio construction methodology. First sub-chapter 
introduces the data in a detailed way and briefly discusses its major drawbacks. Second 
sub-chapter introduces the information discreteness measurement, the main component 
of the portfolio construction, and its alternative. 
4.1.  Data 
My data contains the constituents of the Stoxx Europe 600 index from the end of Janu-
ary 2004 to the end of August 2019. I will use the constituents of the Stoxx Europe 600 
index as proxy for the largest 600 firms from the European region. My data methodology 
loosely follows the methodology of Asness et al. (2013: 933–934), as they focused on the 
“a very liquid set of securities that could be traded for reasonably low cost at reasonable 
trading volume size” to have a conservative result, as the momentum is shown to stronger 
on smaller firms. Also, focusing on the largest sample of stocks, makes this strategy easier 
to implement on practise, as for example, many of the smallest stocks are, or almost are, 
impossible to sell short. 
As different academic papers use different definition for European markets, I will use the 
definition of Stoxx Europe. The Stoxx Europe 600 contains firms from 17 countries of 
the European region: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ire-land, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom. Also, due to the index construction method, the Stoxx 
Europe 600 index contains the stocks that are both the largest and the most liquid stocks, 
as every stock within “the STOXX universe” is assigned to the Stoxx’s own “Free float 
factor” to reduce free-float market capitalization to the actual number of shares that are 
available to trade (Stoxx 2019). For example, this Free float factor excludes the shares 
that are owned by the company itself, governments and other long-term owners that own 
more than 5 percent of the total market capitalization (Stoxx 2019).  
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Because of data availability issues, I have to use this same set of firms to the whole study 
period. Therefore, the data is under a survivorship bias, as it does not contain firms that 
are delisted during the study period. This leads to the situation, where the results of the 
study might be too optimistic or pessimistic. The number of firms at the beginning of the 
sample is 348 and at the end, there are 533 firms after excluding stocks that are less than 
5$ at the beginning of each month. Also, I have formed the first test portfolios at the end 
of November 2005, to have at least 2/3 of the firms from the constituents of the index at 
the data collection date. Afterall, firms should have at least 12 to 24 months of return data 
to be included in portfolios due to the portfolio construction methods. 
In addition to the daily price data, I have accounting based data for market-to-book ratio, 
market capitalization, revenues, total assets, return-on-equity ratio and firm-based data 
for exchange, equity type, sector, listing currency and symbol. Accounting based data is 
either quarterly or semi-annual, depending on the release frequency. All data came from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. For risk adjustments, I use the factors from French’s da-
tabase. To compare the results, both firm data and factor data is in United States dollars, 
so I have a view of an American investor. 
4.2.  Methodology 
As already briefly discussed on the introduction, I use the Information discreteness meas-
urement by Da et al. (2014) as my proxy for the quality of the past returns. ID is deter-
mined in the equation 11: 
(11)   𝐼𝐷 = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇) ∗ (%𝑛𝑒𝑔 − %𝑝𝑜𝑠), where 
(12)   %𝑝𝑜𝑠 =  𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 ∑  𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑡,𝑡−1 > 0                   
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                      
𝑡
𝑡−251  
(13)   %𝑛𝑒𝑔 = 1 − %𝑝𝑜𝑠 
Where sign(PRET) is the sign of the cumulative return of the past twelve skipping the 
most recent month and have values +1 when the PRET is > 0 and -1 when the PRET is 
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<0. %neg (%pos) is the percentage of negative (positive) days during the twelve-month 
formation period (I use 21 trading days per month, as an average of trading days per 
month). Negative (positive) days are days, when the daily return is negative (positive) 
and got a value of 0(1). Percent positive is a rolling mean of a sum of positive days, and 
as zero return days are handled as a negative, then percent negative is just 1 minus percent 
positive. Because my data set contains only the largest and most liquid stocks, I handle 
zero days as negatives, which is opposite than Da et al. (2014) as they handle them as an 
own group and do not count them on the equation. My decision is based on the fact, that 
zero returns days are in my sample mostly national holidays or other market-wide events 
and not the result of illiquidity as discussed by Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999).  
The magnitude of the daily returns is ignored by equally weighting each observation. 
Therefore, the ID got values from -1 to +1, where -1 is the most continuous information 
and +1 is the most discrete information. It is important to notice that ID only measures 
how continuous the information is and not how the stock is performed. For example, if 
stocks A’s past twelve month return is positive (sign[PRET] = +1) and 60 percent of days 
are positive, it got ID of +1*(0,4-0,6) = -0,2 when stock B’s with negative twelve month 
return (sign[PRET] = -1) and 60 percent negative days, got also ID of -0,2 (-1*[0,6-0,4]). 
To follow the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Da et al. (2014), test 
portfolios are formed in a following way. At the beginning of each month, all stocks are 
ranked by their past J- month return to five different portfolios: the winner and the loser 
quantiles and three neutrals between two extremes (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993 used  
deciles and Da et al. 2014 used quantiles). I will use the wider portfolios than Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993), as my sample is much smaller than their, so my results are not so 
driven by the most extreme values. After the rank by past J-month return, each portfolio 
is sub-derived by the ID to five sub portfolios. A total number of portfolios per J-month 
formation period and K-month holding period is therefore 25 from continuous losers (low 
ID and low J-month return) to discrete winners (high ID and high J-month  return). For 
robustness checks, I will also test other formation methods.  
Da et al. (2014) uses 6-month formation period and 6 month holding periods and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) used all combinations of one to four quarters formation and 
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holding periods totaling of 32 different portfolios but focusing on 6/6 portfolios. To fol-
low these methodologies, first I will test the performance of all 25 portfolios with four 
different combinations of formation and holding periods, and then I will focus more on 
6/6 portfolios. Da et al. (2014) computed the ID by using past twelve-month returns, I 
will test if it changes the results to match the formation period of the ID and the past 
return portfolios and I will test to double the formation period, as a robustness check. 
As I have a quite short study period, I will use the methodology of Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993:68) to increase the power of my tests, so I will include “portfolios with overlapping 
holding periods”. This means that at every time t, I will have J different portfolios: a 
portfolio that is formed at time t as well as portfolios that are formed at previous J-1 
months. Therefore, I have to weight each stock with a factor of 1/J, as there are stocks 
that are in more than 1 portfolio at a given time. 
For risk adjustments, I will use the factors from the Ken Frenches database. I will use 4 
different models: Fama’s and French’s three-factor model (1993), the three-factor model 
plus, the momentum factor, Fama’s and French’s five-factor model (2015) and the five-
factor model that includes the momentum factor. All the factor data is from French’s 
(2019) online database. 
4.3.  Methodology of alternative ID measurement 
The ID measurement by Da et al. (2014) is based on the relation between the same and 
the different sign daily returns. Even though the whole idea of the ID measurement is 
based on that investors' miss small amount of information that firms produce, the ID still 
does not take into consideration magnitude of these same sign returns.  
Alternative ID measurement by Da et al. (2014) takes also in the consideration magnitude 
of the returns, by weighting each sign of the return with a decreasing weight. Before the 
weighting is done, absolute values from returns are taken to make sure that both, the same 
magnitude positive and negative returns, have the same weights. The smallest return 
quantile got a weight of 5/15, next got the weight of 4/15 and so on till the highest 
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quantile, that got a weight of 1/15. Weighting is arbitrarily chosen to strictly follow a 
methodology of Da et al. (2014). 
After the weighting is done, I take one-year (252 trading days) rolling sum of these 
weighted signs and multiply it by the sign of the one-year return on that same period. 
After that, this whole equation is divided by 252 to have a daily alternative ID measure-
ment. After all, the alternative ID measurement is as in equation 13. 
(14)   𝐼𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑔 = −
1
𝑁⁄ ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑇) ∗ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖) ∗ 𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖  
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5. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
This chapter shows the empirical findings of the study. The first sub-chapter reports the 
results for different formation and holding periods for both long only and long-short port-
folios. Second sub-chapter reports the summary statistics for firm-characteristics in long-
only six months formation and holding period portfolios.  The next sub-chapter reports 
multivariate time-series regressions on Fama and French factors. Lastly, the rest of the 
chapter discusses the results of different portfolio formation methods.  
5.1.  Summary statistics for different formation and holdin periods 
Table 1 reports the long-only portfolios monthly mean returns and corresponding t-statis-
tics, standard deviations, skewness’s and kurtosis. In this table, I have tested four equal 
length formation and holding period pairs: three and three, six and six, nine and nine, and 
twelve and twelve months, and four different double sorted extreme quantile portfolios 
(continuous winners and losers, discrete winners and losers) plus traditional momentum 
quantiles. I have focused on these formation periods and portfolios for simplicity, because 
all combinations of one to four quartiles would totalled 16 different combinations plus 25 
combinations from 5*5 quantiles would have totalled 16*25 = 400 different portfolios.  
Double sorting the portfolios first by past J months return and then by ID have mixed 
results. On longer formation and holding periods, especially discrete winners outperform 
traditional momentum portfolios, whereas continuous do not. Almost every long-only 
portfolio has a positive and significant return when formation and holding period is six-
months or longer. For example, nine- and twelve-month discrete winners have the average 
returns of 1,086 and 1,242 percent per month with the t-statistics of 6,170 and 7,667. On 
the other hand, the shortest formation and holding periods are mostly the least profitable 
strategies among tested portfolios and also have the lowest t-statistics among all, when 
two portfolios are insignificant (continuous losers, with t-statistic of 1,806 and discrete 
losers with t-statistic of 1,775) on usual significant levels.  
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The differences between continuous and discrete portfolios are unexpectable, as Da et al. 
(2014: 2184) find that continuous portfolios outperform discrete ones with relatively wide 
margin, when I find the opposite. Even though the differences are not as found by Da et 
al. (2014), there are differences between average returns, but that difference is not always 
statistically different from a zero. For example, in the six-month formation and holding 
period, the difference between continuous and discrete losers is -0,185 but t-statistic is 
only -1,613. On the other hand, on the winners’ side on 12 months holding and formation 
period, the difference between continuous and discrete is -0,437 with t-statistic of -6,411, 
so the comprehensive conclusion about the differences of the average returns of long-
only portfolios cannot be made. Also, these findings questions formation and holding 
periods used by Da et al. (2014), as six months is not the best possible option in all cases. 
Table 1. Summary statistics for different formation and holding periods – long-only portfolios. The 
final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Portfolios are formed in a following way: at the 
beginning of each month, every stock is ranked by its past K-month raw return, skipping one month, 
then sub-ranking is done with the ID measurement, which is the product of the sign of the past 12-month 
return, skipping one month, and the difference between the proportion of negative and positive days. 
Therefore, ID got values between -1 and 1, where lower values of ID indicate that information is con-
tinuous and higher values indicate that information is discrete. After all, a portfolio of stocks is held for 
J-months. At any point of time, there are J different portfolios, so the return of the portfolio is divided 
by J to have a monthly average return. 
J/K
3/3 Mean 0,569 0,474 0,582 0,606 0,614 0,618
T.stat 1,806 1,775 2,466 2,858 2,829 2,207
Standard dev. 4,051 3,427 3,026 2,723 2,791 3,590
Skewness 0,708 -0,953 -0,494 -1,034 -0,694 0,118
Kurtonis 5,143 5,325 4,099 3,593 3,203 5,503
6/6 Mean 0,518 0,703 0,875 0,939 0,872 0,700
T.stat 1,911 2,917 4,014 4,815 4,338 2,834
Standard dev. 3,449 3,069 2,774 2,484 2,555 3,141
Skewness 1,529 0,878 -0,884 -1,090 -0,933 1,225
Kurtonis 8,013 5,826 3,076 2,099 2,588 7,034
9/9 Mean 0,611 0,584 0,886 1,086 0,974 0,687
T.stat 2,464 2,835 4,763 6,170 5,663 3,026
Standard dev. 3,122 2,591 2,339 2,219 2,164 2,859
Skewness 2,219 0,832 -0,790 -0,641 -0,784 1,555
Kurtonis 10,316 3,080 1,238 0,383 0,944 6,857
12/12 Mean 0,537 0,639 0,805 1,242 0,966 0,713
T.stat 2,872 3,294 4,909 7,667 6,192 3,733
Standard dev. 2,332 2,420 2,044 2,018 1,944 2,387
Skewness 1,004 0,884 -0,319 -0,441 -0,600 0,937
Kurtonis 4,170 2,552 0,287 0,195 0,528 3,433
Loser
Summary statisctics for different formation/holding period long only portfolios
Continuous 
loser
Discrete 
loser
Continuous 
winner
Discrete 
winner
Winner
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Riskiness of the long-only portfolios is decreasing when the formation and holding period 
is increasing. For example, in the lowest ID portfolios (continuous) the standard deviation 
of loser portfolio decreases from 4,051 to 2,332 and in winner portfolio it decreases from 
3,026 to 2,044 when one move from 3/3 to 12/12. Risk-characteristics of the portfolios 
differs quite a lot when the return distributions are more closely investigated with skew-
ness and kurtosis. Most of the loser portfolios have positive skewness, which indicates 
that these distributions have long positive tail, or on the other words, these portfolios have 
a positive tail risk. Also, losers have much higher kurtosis, or their return distributions 
are leptokurtic.  
On the other hand, winner portfolios have skewness lower than zero, which means that 
these portfolios have negatively tailed distribution and these portfolios are more exposed 
to negative events than losers’ side. Shorter formation and holding periods have higher 
kurtosis compared with longer periods, so these shorter portfolios have more extreme 
events than longer ones. ID affects a little to these shape of the return distribution meas-
urements, as plain momentum winners and losers' skewness’s and kurtosis are approxi-
mately in the middle of continuous and losers. For example, in the 9-month holding and 
formation period, average skewness for continuous and discrete losers is 1,526 and for 
plain momentum loser, skewness is 1,555. 
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J/K
3/3 Mean 0,013 0,109 0,036 0,132 -0,004
T.stat 0,074 0,858 0,178 0,947 -0,031
Standard dev. 2,322 1,627 2,618 1,784 1,597
Skewness -1,262 -0,175 -2,000 -0,330 -2,692
Kurtosis 6,205 1,002 12,111 5,221 17,209
6/6 Mean 0,356 0,172 0,420 0,236 0,172
T.stat 2,065 1,240 2,279 1,555 1,284
Standard dev. 2,197 1,764 2,347 1,929 1,705
Skewness -2,055 -1,622 -3,502 -2,941 -3,808
Kurtosis 10,713 5,222 17,894 14,840 21,485
9/9 Mean 0,275 0,302 0,475 0,502 0,287
T.stat 1,488 2,223 2,547 3,789 2,000
Standard dev. 2,332 1,711 2,353 1,670 1,807
Skewness -3,077 -1,543 -3,675 -2,200 -3,948
Kurtosis 14,555 5,005 18,455 8,213 19,506
12/12 Mean 0,268 0,166 0,705 0,603 0,253
T.stat 2,045 1,249 5,140 4,502 2,237
Standard dev. 1,638 1,662 1,713 1,673 1,414
Skewness -1,753 -1,820 -2,012 -1,950 -3,248
Kurtosis 6,567 5,743 8,097 7,119 14,338
Continuous winner 
minus discrete loser
Continuous winner 
minus continuous loser
Discrete winner minus 
continuous loser
Discrete winner minus 
discrete loser
Winner minus loser
Summary statistics for different formation/holding period long-short portfolios
Table 2. Summary statistics for different formation and holding periods – long-short portfolios. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. 
Portfolios are formed in a following way: at the beginning of each month, every stock is ranked by its past K-month raw return, skipping one month, then 
sub-ranking is done with the ID measurement, which is the product of the sign of the past 12-month return, skipping one month, and the difference between 
the proportion of negative and positive days. Therefore, ID got values between -1 and 1, where lower values of ID indicate that information is continuous 
and higher values indicate that information is discrete. After all, a portfolio of stocks is held for J-months. At any point of time, there are J different 
portfolios, so the return of the portfolio is divided by J to have a monthly average return. 
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The performance of long-short portfolios is reported in table 2, where I have compared 
four different winners minus loser long-short portfolios and the plain momentum portfo-
lio as a benchmark. The winner minus loser portfolio with continuous information (low 
ID) returned on average 0,013 (3/3 portfolio)  to 0,268 (12/12 portfolio) percent per month 
with t-statistics from 0,074 (3/3 portfolio) to 2,045 (12/12 portfolio), when discrete equiv-
alents have returned on average 0,132 (t-statistic 0,947 for 3/3 portfolio) to 0,603 (t-sta-
tistic 4,502 for 12/12 portfolio) percent per month. In both cases, only two out of four 
portfolios are significant, 6/6 and 12/12 for continuous and 9/9 and 12/12 for discrete. 
The discrete winner minus loser portfolio outperforms its continuous equivalents in three 
out of four cases. Only exception is 6-month holding and formation period, where discrete 
portfolio is not significantly different from zero (mean is 0,236 with t-statistic of 1,555). 
Surprisingly, in most formation and holding periods that are significant, discrete winner 
minus continuous loser is the best performing portfolio. For example, that portfolio has 
returned on average 0,705 percent per month with t-statistic of 5,140 in 12-month for-
mation and holding period, when corresponding return on the 6-month portfolio is 0,420 
percent with t-statistic of 2,279. In the 9-month holding and formation period, discrete 
winner minus loser is the best performing portfolio with the monthly average return of 
0,502 percent with t-statistic of 3,789. All though, it has to be pointed out that the differ-
ences are still very small and for example, two sample t-test indicates that difference in 
means between two best-performing portfolios in 6-month formation and holding period 
is not significant (t-statistic of -0,253). 
Even though the returns of the ID portfolios are much smaller than in Da et al. (2014), 
these portfolios still outperform its plain momentum equivalent. For example, in 6-month  
winner minus loser portfolios, there is only one portfolio, continuous winner minus loser, 
where the return is actually lower than in plain momentum. Return of that portfolio hap-
pens to be also insignificant, so every portfolio with a significant return outperforms the 
plain momentum. This is also true for longer formation and holding periods. 
Double sorting the plain momentum portfolios with ID decreases the riskiness of the port-
folios as measured by the shape of the return distribution. In every formation and holding 
period, the plain momentum portfolio is the most negatively skewed and has the highest 
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kurtosis, indicating that extreme events have a major impact on the portfolio. From ID 
portfolios, the highest return comes mostly with the highest risk, as discrete winner minus 
continuous loser is mostly the riskiest portfolio, when the opposite is true for continuous 
winner minus discrete loser.  
Different return distributions of winners and losers are a cause the riskiness of the long-
short portfolios. Long legs, or the winners, are highly negatively skewed, when short legs, 
or losers, are positively skewed. Also, the short legs have much higher kurtosis, which 
combined with positive skewness, indicates that there are much more extreme positive 
events than in the long legs of the portfolios. This combined with the negative skewness 
of long legs and the fact, that these extreme events happen to happen at the same time, is 
the source of the riskiness of long-short momentums or the so-called momentum crashes 
(see e.g. Daniel and Moskowitz 2016 for further discussion).  
Interestingly, continuous losers are more exposed to this phenomenon compared with 
discrete losers. Also, discrete winners are riskier than continuous ones. This could be 
rationalized in a following way. The continuous losers are firms which return patterns is 
mainly driven by many losing days. These firms have produced a lot of negative news for 
a long time and therefore investors and analysts have a very pessimistic view on these 
firms. When one of these firm’s managed to turn their direction, the stock price could 
skyrocket in a very short period of time. On the other hand, these discrete winners are the 
firms, which stock price have a lot of variability. There might be, for example, be rumours 
about major acquisition, which increases the share price a lot, but when the actual news 
came out that there is no news, the price will drop dramatically. Combining this two ra-
tionalizing’s could explain the riskiness of the discrete winners minus continuous losers' 
portfolio.   
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5.2.  Long-only portfolios summary statistics for firm characteristics 
Table 3 reports summary statistics for long-only portfolios with the formation and holding 
period of six months. Statistics are calculated for ID, M/B ratio and market cap which is 
a logarithm of 10. ID acts as proxy for the discreteness of the information, M/B is market-
to-book-value statistic that is a “value factor” and a market cap act as size proxy. ID is 
calculated in as equation 11 and its closer description is in chapter 4.2. Market-to-book-
value is a monthly market capitalization of the stock divided by its latest book-value and 
a market cap is a tenth logarithm of a monthly market capitalization. 
As expected of Da et al. (2014), every continuous portfolio has lower ID than its discrete 
counterpart in every reported percentile. Continuous losers have the mean (median) ID of 
-0,108 (-0,102) when discrete ones have 0,038 (0,043) . On the winners’ side, correspond-
ing numbers are -0,116 (-0,110) and 0,028 (0,030). Differences between means are highly 
statistically significant as losers have t-statistic of -53,445 and winners have t-statistic of 
-49,822. These findings are in line with the findings of Da et al. (2014: 2184) as they find 
that average ID among discrete firms is about 0,03 and in among continuous firms it is 
about -0,10. 
Market-to-book-value are in line with the momentum literature, as especially winners got 
larger values indicating that those are “growth” stocks and losers got smaller values, in-
dicating that those are more “value” stocks. Also, continuous stocks are more growth as 
winners have a mean (median) of 3,865 (3,529) and more value as losers have a mean 
(median) of 0,955 (2,039) than discrete ones , where winners have a mean (median) of 
3,633 (3,157) and losers have a mean (median) of 2,256 (2,456) although differences 
between the means of winners and losers are not significant (t-statistic for winners 0,791 
and -1,060 for losers). Extreme values have a higher impact on the continuous losers’ 
portfolio, and therefore the difference between mean and median is much wider than in 
other portfolios. 
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As the sample contains mostly the largest and the most liquid stocks in the European 
region, the size of the firms is relatively stable among all portfolios. There are still statis-
tically significant differences in means, when for example, the difference between con-
tinuous and discrete winners is significantly different from zero with t-statistic of 5,466. 
Although corresponding t-statistic for losers is just 0,506. The difference between con-
tinuous winners and losers is also insignificant with practically zero t-statistic, but differ-
ence between discrete winners and losers is significant with t-statistic of -4,886. These 
findings indicate, that size could explain some of the difference between returns. 
Table 3. Characteristics of firms in different long-only portfolios. The final sample period 
is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. ID measurement is the product of the sign of the past 12-
month return, skipping one month, and the difference between the proportion of negative 
and positive days. Therefore, ID got values between -1 and 1, where lower values of ID 
indicate that information is continuous and higher values indicate that information is discrete. 
M/B or the Market-to-book-value is a monthly market capitalization of the stock divided by 
its latest book-value and a market cap is a tenth logarithm of a monthly market capitalization. 
 
Table 4. Table 5.. Characteristics of firms in different long-only portfolios. The final sample 
period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. ID measurement is the product of the sign of the 
past 12-month return, skipping one month, and the difference between the proportion of neg-
ative and positive days. Therefore, ID got values between -1 and 1, where lower values of 
ID indicate that information is continuous and higher values indicate that information is dis-
Statistic
ID Mean -0,108 0,038 -0,116 0,028
Median -0,102 0,043 -0,110 0,030
Standard dev. 0,027 0,023 0,028 0,024
Min. -0,195 -0,063 -0,186 -0,031
Pctl(25) -0,122 0,031 -0,138 0,008
Pctl(75) -0,089 0,051 -0,094 0,046
Max -0,056 0,083 -0,062 0,088
M/B Mean 0,955 1,783 3,865 3,633
Median 2,039 2,456 3,529 3,157
Standard dev. 7,578 6,640 1,790 3,335
Min. -52,249 -58,871 1,276 -4,969
Pctl(25) 1,377 1,900 2,937 2,546
Pctl(75) 2,613 2,974 4,315 4,097
Max 9,938 7,478 17,630 27,540
Mean 6,915 6,905 6,914 6,803
Median 6,932 6,918 6,905 6,810
Standard dev. 0,181 0,195 0,185 0,182
Min. 0,181 0,195 0,185 0,182
Pctl(25) 6,815 6,781 6,789 6,671
Pctl(75) 7,044 7,027 7,043 6,930
Max 7,323 7,395 7,370 7,160
Continuous 
loser
Mkt 
Cap
Discrete 
loser
Continuous 
winner
Discrete 
winner
Characteristics of different long-only portfolios
53 
5.3.  Regression analysis for long-short portfolios 
Table 4 and 5 reports the performance of the long-short strategies after Fama and French 
(1993 and 2015) and momentum factor risk-adjustments. Returns of the long-short port-
folios are regressed on different combinations of European Fama and French, and mo-
mentum factors, where all factor returns are monthly returns from French (2019) online 
library. The first and the third model are factor models by Fama and French (first model 
is from F&F 1993 and third model is from F&F 2015), and second and fourth models 
adds the momentum factor to latter models. The second model is originally introduced by 
Carhart (1997) and mostly referred as Carhart’s four-factor model, but I will use the term 
FF3 + WML to consistent interpretation. Detailed factor construction methods can be 
found on original papers by Fama and French (1993 and 2015). All standard errors and t-
values are Newey and West (1987) adjusted with a lag of 6 following a methodology of 
Da et al. (2014). 
Table 4 shows that the risk-adjusted alphas for long-short continuous and discrete portfo-
lios are insignificant, even though the average monthly returns are mainly significant. 
This indicates that explanatory factors mainly explain returns of the long-short strategies. 
For the continuous portfolio, the momentum factor is the only factor with significant 
loading. A positive loading of 0,158 (t-statistic 3,762) for FF3 plus the momentum factor 
and a loading of 0,188 (t-statistic 5,081) for FF5 plus the momentum factor indicates that 
the winner’s leg of the factor is driving the returns on continuous long-short portfolio.  
In the discrete portfolio, the momentum factor has again positive and significant loading 
of 0,194 (t-statistic 5,389) for FF5 and a loading of 0,232 (t-statistic 5,524) for FF5 plus 
the momentum factor. In FF5 model, the strategy has a negative and significant loading 
of -0,092 with t-statistic -2,275 on the market excess return factor. Also, in FF5 plus the 
momentum factor model, the strategy has a negative and significant loading of -0,338 
with t-statistic of -2,600 on the investment factor, in addition to the negative and signifi-
cant loading on the market factor and positive and significant loading on the momentum 
factor. These risk factors indicate that this discrete long-short portfolio is driven by ag-
gressively investing short-term winners and this strategy offers a small hedge against the 
market movements. 
54 
Adjusted R-squared shows that every of the tested models do a very bad work to explain 
the variability in the continuous portfolio. Values are practically zero, and in the FF5 even 
a negative. Adding the momentum factor slightly increases the value, but it does not 
change the picture. For the discrete portfolio, situation is a somewhat better. Traditional 
Fama and French (1993 and 2015) models still does a very bad work, but adding the 
momentum factor increases the values, as FF3 plus the momentum have the value of 17,9 
percent and FF5 plus the momentum have the value of 20 percent, which are reasonable 
values. F-statistics tell the similar story than R-squared about the power of the models. 
Insignificant F-statistics for the continuous portfolio means that these models do not have 
any predictive capability. On the discrete portfolio, these two models that best explain the 
variability also have the highest F-statistics.  
As Da et al. (2014) have only FF3 risk-adjustments, it is only meaningful to compare FF3 
risk-adjusted returns. Neither continuous nor discrete long-short portfolio have the sig-
nificant returns, which is not completely in line with the findings of Da et al. (2014). 
Because Da et al. (2014) do not report their factor loadings, I cannot compare the results 
in more detailed way.  They find that discrete portfolios have insignificant FF3 alpha in 
their full sample, but when they study more recent sample period, also discrete portfolio 
has significant alpha. As my FF3 and other alphas are in both cases insignificant, I have 
to reject my hypotheses 1 that the strategy that sorts stocks by its six-month past return 
and then by its ID measurement and holds these stocks for six months do not generate 
risk-adjusted returns. These findings mean that sub-sorting momentum portfolios by ID 
do not increase the risk-adjusted performance of the plain momentum strategy in this 
sample. 
Combining continuous and discrete portfolios increases the profitability of the long-short 
portfolios compared with pure continuous or discrete portfolios, as already shown in table 
2. Although, it could be seen from table 5 that both combination portfolios have insignif-
icant alphas, which means that these neither of the portfolios can generate significant risk-
adjusted returns. Strategies have similar loadings on Fama and French (1993 & 2015) 
factors and on the momentum factor than in the pure portfolios. Again, the momentum 
factor has both positive and significant loadings in both portfolios and for both models 
than include the factor. For discrete winners minus continuous losers, the investment 
55 
factor has a significantly negative loading of -0,327 and t-statistic -1,970.  For this port-
folio, market factors have close to significant loadings but not enough at 5 percent level. 
The same is true for investments factor loading in continuous winner minus discrete loser 
portfolio.  
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Model: FF3 FF3+WML FF5 FF5+WML FF3 FF3+WML FF5 FF5+WML
Constant 0,260 0,142 0,285 0,194 0,158 0,014 0,211 0,099
0,743 0,472 0,934 0,764 0,551 0,051 0,805 0,414
Market -0,040 -0,010 -0,051 -0,041 -0,078 -0,040 -0,091 -0,079
-1,000 -0,294 -1,000 -0,872 -1,696 -1,143 -2,275 -2,548
SMB 0,094 0,107 0,080 0,064 -0,036 -0,020 -0,058 -0,079
1,237 1,574 0,930 0,877 -0,439 -0,247 -0,734 -1,068
HML -0,070 0,030 -0,060 0,116 -0,117 0,007 -0,136 0,081
-0,547 0,240 -0,302 0,703 -0,745 0,050 -0,638 0,529
RMW -0,029 -0,052 -0,098 -0,126
-0,166 -0,323 -0,731 -1,068
CMA -0,075 -0,269 -0,098 -0,338
-0,532 -1,805 -0,676 -2,600
WML 0,158 0,188 0,194 0,232
3,762 5,081 5,389 5,524
R2 0,029 0,080 0,030 0,094 0,097 0,199 0,101 0,230
Adjusted R2 0,010 0,056 -0,001 0,059 0,080 0,179 0,072 0,200
Residual Std.Error 2,184 2,132 2,196 2,129 1,831 1,730 1,838 1,707
F Statistic 1,548 3,383 0,960 2,661 5,622 9,694 3,499 7,664
Time series regression for winner minus loser portfolios on Fama and French factors: continuous minus continuous and discrete minus discrete
Discrete winners minus discrete losers             
Dependent variable: Dependent variable: 
Continuous winner minus continuous loser
Table 4. Time series regression results on Fama and French factors. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Dependent variable is the pure 
winner minus loser long-short portfolio and independent variables are the Fama and French factors obtained from French database. Four different models are 
tested: Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3), FF3 + the momentum factor, Fama and French (2015) five factor model (FF5) and FF5 plus the momen-
tum factor. Factor loadings are on the top and on the bottom, t-statistics are in italic. Bolded values are significant at 5 percent level. All standard errors and t-
statistics are Newey and West (1987) adjusted. 
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Model: FF3 FF3+WML FF5 FF5+WML FF3 FF3+WML FF5 FF5+WML
Constant 0,083 -0,078 0,071 -0,049 0,335 0,234 0,425 0,342
0,318 -0,338 0,283 -0,239 0,855 0,655 1,304 1,188
Market -0,048 -0,006 -0,051 -0,039 -0,070 -0,044 -0,090 -0,081
-0,923 -0,143 -1,214 -1,147 -1,892 -1,517 -1,765 -1,761
SMB 0,056 0,074 0,055 0,034 0,002 0,013 -0,034 -0,049
0,659 0,914 0,775 0,576 0,027 0,191 -0,358 -0,583
HML -0,073 0,065 -0,036 0,196 -0,114 -0,028 -0,160 0,001
-0,575 0,602 -0,196 1,496 -0,630 -0,163 -0,623 0,005
RMW 0,050 0,021 -0,178 -0,198
0,336 0,163 -0,798 -0,961
CMA -0,024 -0,280 -0,150 -0,327
-0,110 -1,718 -1,111 -1,970
WML 0,217 0,248 0,136 0,172
7,750 7,515 3,487 4,649
R2 0,048 0,198 0,049 0,222 0,056 0,089 0,064 0,111
Adjusted R2 0,03 0,177 0,018 0,192 0,038 0,066 0,034 0,076
Residual Std.Error 1,73 1,593 1,74 1,578 2,290 2,257 2,295 2,244
F Statistic 2,639 9,626 1,595 7,344 3,091 3,813 2,115 3,209
OLS       OLS
Time series regression for winner minus loser portfolios on Fama and French factors: continuous minus discrete and discrete minus continuous
Discrete winners minus continuous losers             
Dependent variable:                      Dependent variable:
Continuous winner minus discrete loser
Table 5. Time series regression results on Fama and French factors. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Dependent variable is the pure 
winner minus loser long-short portfolio and independent variables are the Fama and French factors obtained from French database. Four different models are 
tested: Fama and French (1993) three factor model (FF3), FF3 + the momentum factor, Fama and French (2015) five factor model (FF5) and FF5 plus the 
momentum factor. Factor loadings are on the top and on the bottom, t-statistics are in italic. Bolded values are significant at 5 percent level. All standard errors 
and t-statistics are Newey and West (1987) adjusted. 
58 
5.4.  Different length of the ID formation period 
ID construction methods by Da et al. (2014) uses daily returns for past year. In this sub-
chapter, ID formation period is matched to the formation period of PRET and doubled, to 
test if the length of the formation period of ID affects the results. Results of this compar-
ison are reported in table 6, where panel A reports the results of original construction 
period, panel B reports the results of shorter construction period and finally, panel C re-
ports the results of longer construction period.  
Shortening the formation period does not change the performance, as the results show 
that shorter formation periods have even lower and less insignificant results than the orig-
inal formation period. For example, the long legs of the long-short portfolios have lower 
returns and the short leg have higher returns than in longer formation periods, which 
means that long-short returns are much smaller. None of the shorter formation period 
average returns or risk-adjusted returns is significant as can be seen from table 6, panel 
B.  
There are a couple of interesting findings, when increasing the formation period of ID. 
First, discrete and continuous long-short portfolios changes places, as now the discrete 
long-short portfolio has a positive and statistically significant average return of 0,315 (t-
statistic 2,042) per month, when the continuous portfolio has insignificant and close to 
zero return. This is totally different to original formation period length, where the contin-
uous portfolio has a positive and significant return, when discrete portfolio return is in-
significant. Secondly, risk-adjusted returns are again insignificant, as alphas are not sig-
nificantly different from zero, even though t-statistics are larger than in the shorter for-
mation period and mainly similar than in original length, as could be seen from table 6, 
panel C. 
Lastly, in unreported time-series regressions, factor loadings for different formation pe-
riod portfolios are mostly in line with the original formation period. In both formation 
period and for every model that includes the momentum factor, that factor has positive 
and significant loading. For the shorter discrete long-short portfolio, only other factor that 
have positive loading is the size factor for FF5 where SMB has a loading of 0,12 with a 
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t-statistic of 1,967. Other models for that portfolio have almost significant SMB factor 
loadings. On the other hand, for longer formation periods, the investment factor has neg-
ative loading that is mostly significant or closely significant at 5 percent level. Also, the 
adjusted R-squared and F-statistics are in line with the original formation periods, so in-
creasing or decreasing the formation period from the original length do not have any 
meaningful effect on the results.  
5.5.  Alternative ID methodology 
Table 7 reports the returns of the alternative ID measurement. It can be easily seen that 
the alternative ID measurement does not increase the profitability of the strategy. Actu-
ally, it gets even worse than in the original ID. The only exception is the alternative ID 
continuous loser portfolio, which have a higher return than in the original equivalent. As 
the losers' side has a higher return and the winners' side lower returns, the long-shorts are 
even worse. All long-short returns are insignificant, both before and after risk adjust-
ments. Even chancing the “arbitrary” weighting scheme does not have any impact on the 
results, as unreported results are practically equally bad as reported results. Therefore, 
only conclusion that can be made about the alternative ID measurement is that it is use-
less. 
5.6.  Alternative ID construction methods 
Because some modifications to the original ID construction method were made, the re-
sults of original methods are reported here. First, I handle zero return days as negatives, 
so here those are handled as an own group. Therefore,  the difference part in equation 11 
differs a bit from the methodology that I used. The average returns are mostly in line with 
my previous methodology. The losers' returns are slightly higher, and winners' returns are 
slightly lower than in table 1, so long-short returns are also lower than in table 2. The 
same is true for the risk-adjusted returns as alphas are practically the same in both meth-
ods. Also, factor loadings follow the similar path, as the same factors have approximately 
the same loadings and significant levels. 
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T-stat T-stat
Discrete 0,939 0,703 0,033 0,236 1,555 0,158 0,551 0,014 0,051 0,211 0,805 0,099 0,414
Continuous 0,875 0,518 -0,112 0,356 2,065 0,260 0,743 0,142 0,472 0,285 0,934 0,194 0,764
Continuous minus discrete 0,172 1,240 0,083 0,318 -0,078 -0,338 0,071 0,283 -0,049 -0,239
Discrete minus continuous 0,420 2,279 0,335 0,855 0,234 0,655 0,425 1,304 0,342 1,188
FF3 + 
WML 
Alpha T-stat
FF5 + 
WML 
Alpha T-stat
Discrete 0,880 0,790 0,043 0,090 0,560 0,002 0,007 -0,129 -0,512 0,022 0,090 -0,072 -0,344
Continuous 0,786 0,570 -0,149 0,216 1,154 0,123 0,291 0,000 0,001 0,183 0,523 0,093 0,317
Continuous minus discrete -0,004 -0,024 -0,098 -0,323 -0,248 -0,954 -0,088 -0,337 -0,193 -0,885
Discrete minus continuous 0,310 1,637 0,223 0,566 0,119 0,340 0,294 0,886 0,213 0,742
FF3 + 
WML 
Alpha T-stat
FF5 + 
WML 
Alpha T-stat
Discrete 0,842 0,527 0,022 0,315 2,042 0,315 1,006 0,170 0,646 0,309 1,058 0,198 0,835
Continuous 0,673 0,603 -0,083 0,071 0,487 0,059 0,219 -0,042 -0,179 0,137 0,612 0,049 0,263
Continuous minus discrete 0,146 1,015 0,146 0,502 -0,012 -0,050 0,170 0,599 0,043 0,208
Discrete minus continuous 0,239 1,432 0,228 0,695 0,140 0,468 0,275 1,007 0,203 0,825
Panel C: conditionally double sorted portfolios with ID formation length of twice as Da et al. (2014) (504 days)
Winner Loser Avg ID
Winner 
minus loser T-stat
FF3 
Alpha T-stat
FF5 
Alpha T-stat
Comparison of different ID formation periods
Panel A: conditionally double sorted portfolios with ID formation length of 252 days
Panel B: conditionally double sorted portfolios with ID formation length match the lenght of momentum formation period (126 days)
FF3 + 
WML 
Alpha
FF5 + 
WML 
AlphaWinner Loser Avg ID
Winner 
minus loser
FF3 
Alpha T-stat
FF5 
Alpha T-statT-stat
T-stat
FF5 
Alpha T-statWinner Loser Avg ID
Winner 
minus loser T-stat
FF3 
Alpha
Table 6. Average returns and risk-adjusted returns for different ID formation periods. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Risk-adjusted 
returns are the constants from time-series regressions against Fama and French factors. Dependent variable is either the pure or combination winner minus loser 
long-short portfolio and independent variables are the Fama and French factors obtained from French database. All standard errors and t-statistics in regressions 
are Newey and West (1987) adjusted. 
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Table 7. Average returns and risk-adjusted returns for different ID formation methods. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Risk-adjusted returns 
are the constants from time-series regressions against Fama and French factors. Dependent variable is either the pure or combination winner minus loser long-short portfolio 
and independent variables are the Fama and French factors obtained from French database. All standard errors and t-statistics in regressions are Newey and West (1987) 
adjusted. 
 
Table 22. Summary statistics for different formation and holding periods – long-short portfolios. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Portfolios are 
formed in a following way: at the beginning of each month, every stock is ranked by its past K-month raw return, skipping one month, then sub-ranking is done with the 
ID measurement, which is the product of the sign of the past 12-month return, skipping one month, and the difference between the proportion of negative and positive days. 
Therefore, ID got values between -1 and 1, where lower values of ID indicate that information is continuous and higher values indicate that information is discrete. After 
all, a portfolio of stocks is held for J-months. At any point of time, there are J different portfolios, so the return of the portfolio is divided by J to have a monthly average 
return.Table 23. Average returns and risk-adjusted returns for different ID formation methods. The final sample period is from 30/11/2005 to 30/08/2019. Risk-adjusted 
returns are the constants from time-series regressions against Fama and French factors. Dependent variable is either the pure or combination winner minus loser long-short 
portfolio and independent variables are the Fama and French factors obtained from French database. All standard errors and t-statistics in regressions are Newey and West 
(1987) adjusted. 
T-stat T-stat
Discrete 0,939 0,703 0,033 0,236 1,555 0,158 0,551 0,014 0,051 0,211 0,805 0,099 0,414
Continuous 0,875 0,518 -0,112 0,356 2,065 0,260 0,743 0,142 0,472 0,285 0,934 0,194 0,764
Continuous minus discrete 0,172 1,240 0,083 0,318 -0,078 -0,338 0,071 0,283 -0,049 -0,239
Discrete minus continuous 0,420 2,279 0,335 0,855 0,234 0,655 0,425 1,304 0,342 1,188
FF3 + 
WML 
Alpha T-stat
FF5 + 
WML 
alpha T-stat
Discrete 0,706 0,711 0,017 -0,006 -0,036 0,010 0,036 -0,122 -0,524 0,041 0,155 -0,053 -0,255
Continuous 0,863 0,726 -0,020 0,137 0,930 0,134 0,462 0,046 0,168 0,141 0,538 0,074 0,297
Continuous minus discrete 0,152 0,888 0,171 0,487 0,050 0,166 0,238 0,735 0,153 0,577
Discrete minus continuous -0,020 -0,147 -0,028 -0,119 -0,125 -0,587 -0,056 -0,239 -0,131 -0,609
T-stat
FF5 
Alpha T-statWinner Loser Avg ID
Winner 
minus loser T-stat
FF3 
Alpha
Comparison of different ID formation methods
Panel A: conditionally double sorted portfolios. First by PRET and then by ID
Panel B: conditionally double sorted portfolios. First by PRET and then by alternative ID
FF3 + 
WML 
Alpha
FF5 + 
WML 
alphaWinner Loser Avg ID
Winner 
minus loser
FF3 
Alpha T-stat
FF5 
Alpha T-statT-stat
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6. CONCLUSION 
Price momentum has been one of the most robust and widely studied anomaly in the 
financial markets since it has been founded by Jegadeesh and Titman in 1993. Its exist-
ence has been confirmed numerous times in different markets and in different asset clas-
ses (e.g. Asness et al. 2013).  There are also numerous studies that tries to increase its 
performance by taking other variables into consideration, such as volatility (e.g. Barroso 
and Santa-Clara 2015), industries (e.g. Moskowitz and Grinblatt 1999) and information 
flow (e.g. Da et al. 2014). 
My goal is to test does the information discreteness, introduced by Da et al. (2014), has 
an effect on the performance of the price momentum. Information discreteness is a dif-
ference between proportion of losing and winning in days during last year times the sign 
of the last year returns skipping one month (Da et al. 2014). More precisely, I test does it 
affect the risk-adjusted returns. My results do not support my hypothesis that this strategy 
does generate risk-adjusted returns.  
Surprisingly, both pure continuous and discrete long-short portfolios and combination 
portfolios are mainly driven by the momentum factor. In every tested model that includes 
the momentum factor, it is mostly the only factor with significant loading. A positive 
loading for the momentum factor means that the long leg of the factor, or the winners, are 
driving my portfolios. This is actually true, when I look at the long-only portfolios, where 
both winners and losers have positive and significant returns, which, on the other hand, 
means that the losers' side is decreasing the returns from winners' side in long-short port-
folios.  
Also, in two out of four long-short portfolios, the investment factor has a negative and 
significant loading, which indicates that these portfolios are driven by the short leg of the 
factor or the aggressively investing leg. In one portfolio, discrete long-short, the market 
factor has also negative and significant loading. This is quite interesting, that only one 
portfolio had the significant market factor loading, which could indicate that the other 
models are market neutrals. Other factors, such as value, size and profitability all have 
insignificant loadings in every tested model and in every tested portfolio. There is a 
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potential explanation for these, as other factors, such as the momentum factor explains 
the variability in these factors. If this is true, then traditional factor models by Fama and 
French (1993 and 2015) should have significant loadings on these factors, which is not 
the case.  Therefore, these factors are just redundant to explain the returns of the portfo-
lios. 
Recall from the introduction, that the idea of information discreteness is based on the 
investors' limited capacity to process information and that information flows gradually 
because of that limited processing capacity. Also, the firms in the sample are the largest 
and the most liquid, and therefore have a very broad coverage by financial media and 
analysts, and that is why the price formation process is most likely as efficient as it could 
be in the European region.  Therefore, the relative frequency of the information signal, or 
the k parameter is likely to much smaller than among smaller and less attractive firms. 
This, on the other hand, leads to the situation, where most of the information is discrete, 
which explains the better performance of the discrete portfolios, especially on the win-
ners' side. 
Other potential conflict between my results and Da et al. (2014) results is data mining. 
Mclean and Pontiff (2016), for example, estimated that there is 32 percent decline in re-
turns after the anomaly is published in the academic journal. They also argued that the 
decline is larger for anomalies that contain illiquid stocks, with high idiosyncratic vola-
tility, which are usually the smallest stocks (for more discussion on the dominance of 
microcaps, see e.g. Hou, Xue and Zhang 2018). As my sample contains only the most 
liquid stocks, and the results of Da et al. (2014) are potentially driven by illiquid and 
smaller ones, then this might also explain the difference between results.  
As far as I know, there are not any public and peer-viewed studies, that tries to replicate 
the results of Da et al. (2014). This might be due to the fact that these results are not found 
in different samples of stocks, markets or study periods. This, on the other hand, leads to 
the important question on the reliability of the finance literature. For example, Harvey, 
Liu and Zhu (2016) argued that it is very difficult to publish a paper in the academic 
journal that did not found any results. Also, the research in academic journals are heavily 
64 
skewed to new research on the cost of verifying existing results, which decreases the 
reliability of the research, as the existing results are rarely confirmed.  
Due to the data availability problems, a very complementary conclusion cannot be made. 
My data sample contains the constituents of the index at data gathering date, which is the 
9th of September 2019. Therefore, as the sample length increases, the data is more and 
more biased due to survivorship bias. This means that the sample only contains firms that 
have survived to this data gathering date, and therefore exclude firms that have been 
dropped from the index for some reason. Depending on the reason for the drop, the results 
are likely to be either too optimistic or pessimistic. For example, if the drops are more 
likely to be due to mergers or acquisitions, then the target firms are likely to be dropped 
at a reasonable price, compared with the situation, where the drop has happened because 
the firm has been declared to bankrupt, when the price of the firm is practically zero. In 
the first case, the results are too pessimistic and in the latter case, too optimistic. 
There have to be further research, before the final conclusion of the usefulness of infor-
mation discreteness measurement can be made. Especially, the sample should be much 
wider, include also dropped firms, and include micro, small and medium cap firms to test 
if the results are driven by one of these limitations.  Also, the reliability of the results can 
be increased by having a longer sample period, as I had to shorten it quite a lot to have a 
reasonable number of firms.   
Even though the results of this study are not as expected, it is not completely useless. It 
has to pointed out that the plain momentum returns are still mostly lower than in the 
momentum portfolios, which are subdivided by the information discreteness measure-
ment. Also, as my sample contains the largest and the most liquid firms in Europe, these 
firms are only potential targets for the largest investors in the European markets. Many 
of the largest investors simply cannot invest in the small or medium cap firms. Also, other 
potential users of the results could contain the developers of investment products, such as 
ETFs, where the underlying asset is an index.    
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